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 Structural strategies have been adopted by many developing countries to reduce 
the income/technology gap between them and advanced countries. Results have been 
mixed, however; most countries have failed, but a few have succeeded, newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) in particular. Lin (2003) divides the structural strategies 
into two types: the Comparative-Advantage-Defying (CAD) strategy followed by many 
developing countries and the Comparative-Advantage-Following (CAF) strategy 
followed by NIEs. He argues that following the CAD strategy has a fixed negative effect 
on an economy’s growth over time. This paper however, which allows for the decadal 
changes in economic conditions and uses the OLS method on a sample of 105 
countries and permanent observations of 49 countries, finds that structural strategies’ 
effects vary over time. Such a finding tempers conclusions from Lin (2003) as less 
evidence is found that CAD strategies lower growth. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology has been a major component for economic growth, but without 
progress, it can-not ensure sustainable development. The industrial revolution at the 
end of the eighteenth century is characterized by the emergence of technological 
innovations. Countries who had adopted these technologies were able to produce 
goods more efficiently and to generate more surpluses, which they reinvested in 
upgraded technologies, to accumulate even more capital and to continue growth. But 
those who lacked appropriately progressive technologies were not able to grow as fast, 
and income (productivity) consequently differs between the rich and poor economies 
(Maddison, 2006). The current gap between the richest and poorest economies is 
1:6001 (WDI, 2012). Therefore, acquiring technology has been a goal for all economies 
as a means of growth. 
Figure 1: Historical Real Income per Capita across the World 1820-2008  
 
Source: Maddison, 2010 
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However; the way in which technology should be acquired has been a 
controversial issue for a long time. Economists can be divided into two groups: 
neoliberals who argue that development and technological innovations prosper in a 
liberal competitive market, and that the government’s role is to maintain macroeconomic 
stability and market rules, and structuralists who see more role for the government in 
reducing the technological/income gap between rich and poor countries through 
industrialization policies (Lall, 2004).  
Recently, Lin (2003) proposed a new structural approach in which the 
government’s role is to maintain free market conditions while directing firms toward its 
ultimate goal, the economy’s sustainable development. He argues that a successful 
development strategy is one that follows the economy’s comparative advantage. The 
failure of most development strategies in less developed economies is rooted in their 
mistaken choice of technology/industry. This choice has a constant negative effect on 
the economy’s growth rates over time; the further the choice of technology from the 
economy’s comparative advantage, the greater its negative effect (Lin, 2012). 
Nonetheless, many developing countries have undergone successful reform 
plans (mostly in the 1980s) and were able to achieve high levels of growth since then. 
Also, the world economic conditions have been changing over time; for instance 
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1990s. Therefore; the effects of the 
technology/industry choice could have varied accordingly. This paper validates this 
argument by examining the decadal effect of technology choice on per capita GDP 
growth rate, allowing for the impacts of dynamic local and international economic 
conditions. In effect, we allow the allocation between development strategy and 
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economic growth to change over time. We find less support for Lin's arguments. The 
second section of this paper presents the debate over development strategy in the 
literature, and the third section presents a short review of types of structural strategy. 
Methodology and data are described in the fourth section, followed by econometric 
results and its discussion in the fifth and sixth sections, respectively, with the conclusion 
in the seventh section. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY DEBATE 
Traditionally, capital, labor, and land are the main factors of economic growth. 
While Adam Smith asserted that a liberal market in which prices and output are 
determined by market conditions is the best environment for economic growth (1776). 
But, the income divergence and economic development in currently developed 
countries began with the emergence of technological inventions. Therefore, this classic 
view misses a crucial component in explaining growth divergence (Kuznets, 1955). John 
Stuart Mill, one of the industrial revolution’s acquaintance economists, explained in his 
Principles of Political Economy that delay in growth for any economy is due to a lack of 
technological progress (1848). 
The great depression and the Soviet Union’s economic uprising in the 1930s 
along with the rise of Keynesian economics based on market failure and neoclassical 
classical growth theory led to the adoption of structural economics (Lin, 2012). The 
structural economists regard the government as the major determinant of economic 
growth. Rosenstein-Rodan and others from the structuralist school proposed the “Big 
Bush Theory,” according to which the only way poor economies may narrow the income 
gap with the rich is to direct all their resources and production factors toward capital-
intensive industries, where technology flourishes and generates the highest attainable 
returns, while abandoning their traditional sectors (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Lewis, 
1955; Chenery, 1961; Gershekron, 1962). Moreover, they suggest that developing 
economies should be inward-looking, adopting a protectionist approach to accelerate 
technical advancement and an Import Substitution Industries (ISI) policy to overcome 
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the decline of the terms of trade against their exports of resource-intensive products 
being exploited by rich economies (Prebishch, 1950 ; Singer, 1950). 
However; government intervention through structural strategies in which free 
market conditions are violated with many distortions while firms are granted monopolies 
and showered with various subsidies harm innovation while promoting rent-seeking and 
corruption. Consequently, efficiency and productivity has deteriorated in many 
developing countries, mainly in Latin America, South Asia and Africa (Krueger, 1974; 
Krugman, 2009). 
The neoclassical growth theory developed by Robert Solow (1956) overcame the 
classical theory’s flaw by adding technology to the economic growth factors. However, 
technology is determined outside the model (exogenous), and growth comes mainly 
from capital accumulation (saving). Later, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) came up with 
their endogenous economic growth model, in which technological progress is 
determined by accumulation of capital (physical and human). These models allow 
countries to grow at different long run rates. 
Baumol (1986) Abramovitz (1986) find that technology will lend backward 
economies the momentum to catch up. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1992) have estimated the speed of conditional2 convergence for 
various regions and groups of economies to be around 2%, which is close to the current 
level of the developed countries. Thus, poor countries will sooner or later catch up with 
the rich.  
Nevertheless, this is not the case in the world’s current situation. What we are 
seeing is that economies that have failed to absorb new technologies are unable to 
                                                          
2
 Conditioned to their endowments: saving, human capital and population growth. 
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converge to rich countries. Those that have figured out how to obtain new technologies 
have become the newly industrialized economies (NIEs)3. The success of the NIEs 
revives structural theory, and many economists argue that industrial policies were not 
themselves a problem, since these policies worked for NIEs. The problem was 
excessive incorrect government interventions (Rodrik 1994; Lin, 2012; Lall, 2004; 
Shapiro, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 These economies are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TYPES OF STRUCTURAL STRATEGY 
In his attempt to explain the reasons behind successful industrial policies in the 
NIEs and their counterparts’ failure in other developing countries, Lin (2003) divided 
capital intensive technologies/industries’ strategies into two types: the Comparative-
Advantage-Defying (CAD) strategy followed by many developing countries, and the 
Comparative-Advantage-Following (CAF) strategy followed by NIEs. 
In the first one, the government encourages firms to invest in new 
technologies/industries that do not match the economy’s current comparative advantage 
of endowments. To encourage them the government offers firms large incentives and 
subsidies to overcome profitability problems. These incentives distort the free 
competitive market conditions; labor, financial and international trade markets. 
Moreover, it creates inefficient firms that depend excessively on government 
intervention and consume large amounts of the economy’s scarce resources. In the 
second one, the government works as an investment facilitator in the economy’s 
comparative advantage of endowments. In this case the government maintains free 
competitive market conditions along with efficient business-friendly institutions, 
coordinates firms’ cooperation in technological upgrading, and offers limited financial 
support for pioneer firms to overcome information externality problems. Once the 
economy has reached the targeted industrial level, the government upgrades its target 
to a higher level of technologies/industries (Lin, 2003). 
Lin draws a very thin line between the CAF and CAD strategies. Though the first 
seems more liberal than the second, government intervention in deciding which type of 
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technologies/industries firms should invest in persists in both strategies. Rodrik (2011) 
points out that when the government targets certain industries it implies that firms have 
not yet invested there, which is simply because firms do not see a comparative 
advantage in those industries. Therefore, governments should not interfere in firms’ 
investment decisions because if the market price is not right for them, government 
intervention will not be helpful. Governments should focus only on developing human 
capital and the standard of living while promoting business environment (Krueger, 2011; 
Stiglitz, 2011). 
On the other hand; Lin (2012) finds that “a 10 percent increase from the mean in 
the Technology Choice Index (TCI)4 can result in approximately 0.1 of a percentage 
point reduction in the country’s average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the 
whole period 1962–99.” However; might the association between TCI and economic 
growth have changed over time? Trade liberalization along with the WTO have allowed 
for more trade and factor movements, especially technological diffusion, across 
international borders. These reforms may have changed the association between TCI 
and growth. Note the different slopes for the regression line in each of the decadal 
figures 2-6, showing that the unconditional association between TCI and growth has 
changed. The next section presents the methodology and data used to more carefully 
examine this idea.  
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 A proxy for a country’s strategy proposed by Lin and Liu (2004) which will be discussed further in 
section 4. 
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Figure 2: GDP per Capita and Thechnology Choice 1960s-2000s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: GDP per Capita and Thechnology Choice 1970s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: GDP per Capita and Thechnology Choice 1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
R² = 0.0002 
 (12.00)
 (10.00)
 (8.00)
 (6.00)
 (4.00)
 (2.00)
 -
 2.00
 4.00
 6.00
 8.00
 -  2.00  4.00  6.00  8.00  10.00  12.00
G
D
P
 p
e
r
 C
a
p
it
a
 G
ro
w
th
 
TCI 1990's 
R² = 0.0037 
 (4.00)
 (2.00)
 -
 2.00
 4.00
 6.00
 8.00
 10.00
 12.00
 -  2.00  4.00  6.00  8.00  10.00  12.00
G
D
P
 p
e
r
 C
a
p
it
a
 G
ro
w
th
 
TCI 2000's 
 
Figure 5: GDP per Capita and Thechnology Choice 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: GDP per Capita and Thechnology Choice2000s 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
To examine how the effect of the technology choice index (TCI) on economic 
growth rates can change over time, the OLS regression method is used for cross-
sectional data of 105 economies5. First, its effect on the average data of the period 
1963–2009 is estimated, then on ten-year average data for the decades of the 1970s, 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The regressions for a permanent observation of 49 countries 
for which data is available for all variables in all periods are rerun to make sure that the 
results are robust and not affected by changes in the sample. This estimation model 
follows Lin’s approach (2012), though some of his explanatory variables have been 
replaced with better indices. The model equation is the following: 
                                                                   
     is the real GDP per capita growth rate in economy i in decade t,   is a vector 
of the other explanatory variables which constitute the initial GDP per capita to reflect 
the stage of economic development taken from The Conference Board (2012), the 
share of gross capital formation from the GDP to reflect the effect of capital/investment 
factor, the population growth rate to capture the impact of the increase in the labor 
factor and the market size taken from WDI (2012). The openness index from Wacziarg 
and Welch (2008) is used to capture international integration rather than the trade share 
to avoid the influence of economy size on trade. For institutional quality, rule of law 
                                                          
5
 Data availability and elimination of economies with outlier data in some variables have reduced the 
number of observations in the regressions. 
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index has been replaced with the bureaucratic quality6 measure from ICRG (2011) 
because rule of law can be enforced in countries with varying levels of institutional 
quality. Syria and Tanzania, for example, scored higher on average than South Africa 
and India in the rule of law index, but much below them in terms of the bureaucratic 
quality index. Human capital has been considered via multiple measures as an 
explanatory variable, but all have been highly correlated with other variables, mainly 
institutional quality; therefore, it has been eliminated to avoid the multicollinearity 
problem. Unfortunately endogeneity remains if economic growth reallocates resources 
to or from manufacturing sector or if low growth leads to changes in development 
strategies. 
       is a technology choice index, proposed by Lin and Liu (2004) to proxy a 
country’s development strategy, for economy i in a specific time, and it is computed 
according to the following formula: 
       
            
           
                                                             
Where the numerator is the per worker value added in the manufacturing sector; 
AVMi,t is the total value added of the manufacturing sector in economy i within a certain 
time divided by the number of employees in the manufacturing sector LMi,t. The 
denominator is the per worker value added in the economy as a whole; GDPi,t is the 
economy’s total value added and Li,t is the total number of employees in the economy
7. 
If a country follows CAD strategy, then it will direct more capital to its manufacturing 
                                                          
6 
In this measure: “High rank is given to low risk countries where the institutions tend to be autonomous 
from political pressure, whereas in low ranking (high risk) countries a change in government tends to be 
traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.” (ICRG, 2011)  
7
 The number of employees has been used rather than that of the entire labor force to make accurate 
comparisons between types of workers’ value added and to account for the unemployment effect. 
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sector which, being capital-intensive, will create fewer jobs relative to other sectors. In 
the meantime; manufacturing firms will be provided with subsidies and monopoly power 
that allows them to charge higher prices, consequently they will generate higher value 
added. Therefore; the higher the per-worker value added in the economy’s 
manufacturing sector, the more capital-intensive the sector becomes, the more 
aggressive the government intervention, and the further the economy drifts from its 
comparative advantage (Lin, 2012). Definitions and sources for all variables are 
summarized in Appendix A. 
The effect of the TCI on growth is expected to vary across time. Significant and 
negative during the 1970s, in later decades it is expected to be insignificant as many 
countries have undergone economic reform since the 1980s. Initial per capita income 
and population growth are expected to be inversely correlated with growth, while capital 
formation (investment), openness, and institutional quality are expected to be significant 
and positive all the time. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Table 1 contains the regressions’ estimates. Each pair of columns represents the 
coefficient estimates for the same period. The first one represents estimates for all 
available observations and the second for the permanent observations of 49 
economies, to be referred to as Type 1 and Type 2 observations respectively 
throughout the rest of the paper. As we can see from the table, the TCI has a negative 
effect on growth for the period 1963-2009, but is statistically significant in the Type 1 
observations with a coefficient estimate of -0.654 (s.e=.258), which supports concerns 
about the effect of sample size over long periods of time. For the 1970s, the TCI effect 
is negative and highly significant in both types of observations, its coefficient estimates 
ranging from -1.592 (s.e=.497) to -1.924 (s.e=.529). This means that following the CAD 
strategy as in India, for example, caused India’s TCI level to be around 8% above 
average8, which could have reduced India’s per capita GDP growth rate by 
approximately 0.14% each year during the 1970s. In general, increasing an economy’s 
TCI by one standard deviation in the 1970s would lower that economy growth by 1.59 
standard deviation. Although the TCI levels for the majority of countries do not vary 
much across decades (see table 3), the TCI effect is not significant at all during the next 
three decades for either type of observation. These results confirm the view that the TCI 
effect changes according to surrounding economic conditions and policies. 
Table 1 also illustrates the coefficient estimates for the other explanatory 
variables. Though the initial GDP per capita coefficient estimates are negative as 
                                                          
8
 It had TCI level of 2.7 whereas the average is 2.5, see table 3. 
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expected for all periods, except for the Type 2 observations in the 1990s, they are 
highly significant for the periods 1963-2009, the 1970s and the 1980s for both types of 
observations. Capital formation coefficient estimates are as expected, positive and 
highly significant, during all periods for both types of observations. Population growth 
coefficient estimates are significant with the expected negative sign in the 1980s, and 
for Type 2 observations in the 1990s and Type 1 in the 2000s. The trade liberalization 
effect is significant with the expected positive sign for the 1970s and 1980s and for Type 
2 observations for the period 1963-2009. Institutional quality coefficient estimates are 
significant with the expected positive sign in the 1980s (the transition period) and for 
Type 1 observations for the periods 1963-2009 and the 1990s. The convergence 
between the countries’ economic policies in the 1990s and 2000s, probably because of 
WTO9, might have reduced openness and institutional quality explanatory variables 
ability in explaining the variations in economic growth among various countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In the 1970s only 28 of the total sample of 105 countries were considered open, whereas in the 2000s 
94 countries were considered open. The standard deviation for institutional quality is 1.33 in the 1970s 
and 1 in the 2000s. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results show clearly how the TCI effect upon growth changes over time, 
which may be caused by factors such as technological progress and economic 
conditions and policies. The transition of the TCI coefficient sign from negative in the 
1970s and 1980s10 to positive beginning in the 1990s might reflect major changes in the 
economic conditions such as WTO’s effect on the global economy11, and more 
importantly; the trends in technological development: a slowing in advanced economies 
since the 1970s with the beginnings of a recovery in the 1990s. Here we discuss how 
some of these conditions may have affected growth rates, first in developed countries 
and then in developing countries, taking one country from each group as an example.  
 Technical progress was the main growth factor in the western “Golden Age” of 
the 1950s and 1960s. In the United States, which exists on the technological frontier, 
about 67% of the growth rate in the 1950s and 1960s was caused by the total factor of 
productivity (TFP)12, as shown in Table 2. However; the energy price shock in the 
1970s, along with other changes in the world/local economic conditions13, might have 
slowed down technical progress and then lessened the total global demand in the 
1980s, which in turn caused the TFP’s contribution to fall to its lowest level. Later, the 
development in information technology beginning in the 1990s revived both the growth 
rate and the TFP’s contribution to the growth rate and, in addition, increased labor 
                                                          
10
 For type 1 observations. 
11
 WTO regulations have reduced the trade barriers and limited governments’ ability in supporting their national firms.  
12
 TFP is defined as a “measure of the joint influences of technological change, efficiency improvements, returns to 
scale, reallocation of resources, and other factors on economic growth, allowing for the effects of capital and labor.” 
(BLS, 2012). 
13
 Like the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the Latin American debt crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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productivity (Figure 7), after two decades of a downward trend, which it resumed in the 
2000s. Two of the possible reasons for the labor productivity downtrend in the 2000s 
are increasing competition from developing countries, and the energy price shock. 
Under these conditions of rising competition and operating costs, higher wages and 
energy prices, and slow technological development, firms resorted to physical capital 
investments as compensators. Thus, capital substitutes for technological progress as 
the main factor of growth in advanced economies since the 1980s.  
Table 2: Source of Growth in the US’ and China’s Economy 
 
 
 
 
Source: US data (BLS, 2012). China data (Ozyurt, 2009) 
On the other hand, after World War II many developing countries followed 
structural strategies aggressively to speed up industrialization. Indeed, these strategies 
brought about some technical development until the 1970s, but those countries have 
been unable to upgrade these technologies to a higher level. Therefore, their growth 
rate has been depending on capital.  
There are many different reasons, for the slow growth and technical development 
in those countries, but in general it may be attributed to the following factors which are 
 
Period 
Output 
Growth 
Contribution 
of Labor % 
Contribution 
of Capital % 
Contribution 
of TFP % 
US 
1950s 2.85 0.09 0.23 0.68 
1960s 2.88 0.05 0.28 0.67 
1970s 1.97 0.01 0.42 0.57 
1980s 1.46 0.21 0.60 0.19 
1990s 1.98 0.18 0.43 0.39 
2000s 2.48 0.11 0.53 0.36 
      
China 
1952-1965 12.38 0.04 0.79 0.17 
1966-1978 7.85 0.23 0.76 0.01 
1979-1992 8.57 0.10 1.21 -0.31 
1993-2005 10.46 0.01 0.71 0.28 
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mentioned in most development literature: First, the lack of appropriate human capital, 
the engine of innovations and management skills. Second, the lack of business-friendly 
environment in terms of infrastructure, regulations and institutions. Third, the 
technological slowdown in the advanced economies, which are the source of imitation. 
Fourth, the increase in their industries’ operation costs. Most of their technologies have 
been energy-intensive, and as energy prices rose in the 1970s these technologies did 
not add much to their economic growth. However, in the 1980s the world demand fell 
and at the same time many developing countries started a gradual opening up of 
policies and economic reforms. The timing of this transition was very important for 
replacing and upgrading aging technologies with new ones at lower prices and for 
lowering the costs of economic reforms in general.  
Another reason for spending on new technologies during times of recession is to 
stimulate the economy. For example, the TFP contribution to China’s growth rate for the 
period of 1952-1965 was about 17%. However, it fell to 1% in the 1970s, then; it 
reduced the growth by 31% in the 1980s which might be associated with the reform 
costs. It took off during the last two decades where it contributed 28% of China’s growth 
rate, as shown in Table 2, arguably as a result to the economic reforms and joining 
WTO. 
Labor productivity growth in developing countries also moved along with the 
technological development trend, reaching its peak in the 1970s. It fell below zero in the 
1980s, but then overlapping labor productivity growth in the advanced economies in the 
2000s, as illustrated in Figure 7. However, labor’s contribution to growth in developing 
countries is far below the levels of the advanced economies (except in the 1970s) since 
 20 
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their wages are still low as compared with their counterparts in advanced economies. 
These low wages along with the adopted new technologies of production could have 
cushioned the shock energy prices delivered in the 2000s. However, capital is still the 
major growth factor for developing economies. 
Figure 7: Labor Productivity Growth Trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Total Economy Database (TCB, 2012) 
It can be seen that technological progress increases labor productivity, 
accelerates growth rates, and lowers reliance on capital and labor as means of growth. 
Therefore, the changes in the TCI coefficient sign follow the changes in the TFP. It had 
a negative sign during the 1970s and 1980s when the TFP deteriorated, then become 
positive as the TFP turned around in the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, a large part of the 
changes in the TFP in developing countries can be linked to gradual economic reforms 
and openness policies, which allow for the adoption of new methods of source 
allocation, production, and management. In Table 3 we can see that many of the 
developing countries who achieved high growth rates still have high TCI levels and in 
some cases (as with India and Korea) it has increased. We may infer that they have not 
abandoned the capital-intensive technology/industry strategy, but that they are 
managing it differently. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
TCI effect changes owing to many factors, both locally and internationally. 
However, technological progress has a clear effect on it and on growth rates and 
productivity. Therefore, the intensive capital technology/industries strategy alone is not 
enough to ensure sustainable growth, since technologies always need to be upgraded. 
On the other hand, the interaction between local policies and global economic 
conditions could also influence how the reliance on manufacturing affects growth rates, 
and so economic policies need to be adjusted while maintaining free competitive market 
conditions, which is not an easy task.  
The gradual economic reforms and removing of barriers that hindered economic 
growth in many developing countries (in other words, switching from a CAD to a CAF 
strategy) could have been crucial in promoting sustainable development during 1970s. 
This gradual-transition approach has enabled many developing countries to achieve 
high growth rates. However, after the completion of the reforms with all available 
production factors being fully utilized, only technological progress will provide the means 
for sustainable development. Perhaps that is why, since 1970s I find less support that 
the choice of development strategy as proxied by TCI is important. 
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Appendix A: Data and Sources. 
Variable Definition Sources 
TCI  
 
Technology Choice Index. This is a 
proxy for a country’s development 
strategy.  
Lin And Liu (2004). 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Production (Current 
US$) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI,2012) 
Total Employment 
 
Total Employment in the Economy 
 
Total Economy Database, The 
Conference Board (TCB,2012) 
Manufacturing, 
Value Added  
Gross Domestic Production in the 
Manufacturing Sector (Current US$) 
United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization’s  
Industrial Statistics (UNIDO, 2012) 
Manufacturing, 
Employees 
Number of Employees in the 
Manufacturing Sector 
United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization’s  
Industrial Statistics (UNIDO, 2012) 
Real GDP Per 
Capita 
GDP Per Capita in 1990 US$ (Converted 
at Geary Khamis PPPs) 
Total Economy Database, The 
Conference Board (TCB,2012),  
 Derived from Maddison (2007). 
GDP Per Capita 
Growth Rate 
% of Annual Growth Rate in Real GDP 
per Capita. 
Total Economy Database, The 
Conference Board (TCB,2012),  
 Derived from Maddison (2007). 
Capital Formation Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI,2012) 
Population Growth % of Annual Growth Rate of Population  
World Bank Development 
Indicators (Wdi,2012) 
Openness  Index of Trade Liberalization 
Trade Liberalization And Growth  
 (Wacziarg And Welch, 2008),  
According To Sachs And Warner 
(1995).  
 Quality of 
Institutions 
 Bureaucracy Quality Measure 
 International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG, 2011) 
Labor Productivity 
Per Person Employed in 1990 US$ 
(Converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) 
Total Economy Database, The 
Conference Board (TCB,2012) 
 
 
 30 
 
 
VITA 
 
Graduate School 
Southern Illinois University 
 
Mohammed Alharbi       
 
malharbi@gmail.com  
 
King Saud University, Riyadh 
Bachelor of Science, Operations Research, December 1998 
 
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague 
Post-Graduate Diploma in Development Planning Techniques, July 2001 
 
 
Research Paper Title: 
Economic Growth Strategies:  
Has the effect of development strategy upon growth changed over time? 
 
Major Professor:  Kevin Sylwester 
 
 
